新质生产力背景下，区块链以其透明性、可追溯性等特点为传统产业带来了转型升级的新机遇，也为木材供应链的碳减排合作开辟了新路径。为此，构建中俄木材供应链的演化博弈模型，研究区块链平台下四方主体——俄罗斯木材供应商、中国木材加工制造商、木制品分销零售商以及政府在碳减排合作机制中的运行演化规律。结果表明，供应链成员的初始策略概率、消费者低碳偏好度以及制造商碳减排量增加，均能有效激励木材供应链上的主体成员积极参与碳减排合作机制，同时，政府奖惩机制也会影响博弈系统的最终稳定结果，对搭便车行为的惩罚力度越大，越有利于博弈系统达到理想状态，而过度补贴则会削弱系统达到最优均衡的可能性。研究成果为中俄木材供应链碳减排合作提供理论启发与参考。

Under the background of new quality productivity， blockchain has brought new opportunities for transformation and upgrading of traditional industries with its transparency and traceability， and also opened up a new path for carbon emission reduction cooperation in wood supply chain. In view of this， this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of China-Russia wood supply chain， and studies the operating evolution law of the four parties-Russian wood suppliers， China wood processing manufacturers， wood products distribution retailers and the government in the carbon emission reduction cooperation mechanism under the blockchain platform. The results show that the initial strategy probability of supply chain members， consumers' low-carbon preference and the increase of manufacturers' carbon emission reduction can effectively encourage the main members of the wood supply chain to actively participate in the carbon emission reduction cooperation mechanism. At the same time， the government reward and punishment mechanism will also affect the final stable result of the game system. The greater the punishment for hitchhiking， the better the game system will reach the ideal state， while excessive subsidies will weaken the possibility of the system reaching the optimal equilibrium. The research results provide theoretical inspiration and reference for carbon emission reduction cooperation in China-Russia wood supply chain.